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the Process: Requirements and Design
 Requirements 
 Key driving requirements are flowed down from vehicle.
Derived requirements mature with design and integration concepts.
 Better definition of derived requirements once an architecture is chosen.
 Interdependencies make interfaces difficult to define initially.
 Identification of risks.
 Generic to the basic requirements. 
 Specific to the architecture chosen.
 Outside of our control (changes in requirements and/or interfaces).
 Design and Analysis
 Analysis tools are heritage with limited capability.
 No tool today to predict if a canopy will inflate or remain inflated.
 Industry confidence is grounded in past experience.
Trajectory analysis is critical to designing the ADS.
 The design and manufacture process for parachutes can take 6-8 
months or longer (material lead times alone can be 3-4 months).
2
the Process: Testing
Testing
 Ground testing (when possible) is favorable early (prior to PDR) in 
order to have a chance to influence the ADS design.
 Materials, seam and joint, retention of parachutes, routing of risers 
and harnesses, extraction or deployment of ADS (including mortars).
 Flight testing in particular is very labor, schedule, & cost intensive.
 Required to validate the performance models .
 Test articles, buildup facility, availability of test range(s), test 
operations, data analysis, comparison and updates to models.
 May require developing new or application specific test techniques.
 Additional risks will be identified as the design matures and 
development testing is performed.
 Need for additional tests will likely be identified.
 Dealing with test failures.
 Often resulting from the test setup and not the test hardware itself.
 Unpredictable but potentially huge risk to schedule and cost.
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Margin and Verification
 Critical to carry margin in early ADS definition and design
 The ability of the ADS to react to changes is limited due to length 
of design/manufacture/test cycle.
 The design of the vehicle will mature around the ADS as the 
preliminary design is worked.
 The engineering development testing will drive down the known 
risks going into the Preliminary Design Review.
 Ideally the ADS will ‘return’ the margin at CDR.
 Maturation of vehicle design and requirements could reset the ADS.
Limited experience in human rating large multi-chute ADS
 Most parachute failures occur either during deployment, as a 
result of being implemented outside the intended environment, or 
due to an unidentified coupling of to the recovered mass.
 Full scale flight testing is the key to Human Rating an ADS.
 Coupled multi-body simulations have promise for exploring how well 
the design meets the vehicle level requirements, they will not replace 
testing the deployment and inflation of the flight hardware.
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Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS)
The Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) project is a 
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) project responsible for: the 
design, development testing, performance modeling, fabrication, 
qualification, and delivery of the CEV parachute system to support the 
pad/ascent abort tests and the first three orbital flight tests (including first 
human flight)
CPAS has three basic operational phases
Mortar deployed Forward Bay Cover parachutes to assist removal
Mortar deployed drogues to decelerate and stabilize the capsule
Mains to achieve the steady state landing velocity and hang angle
 Mains are individually deployed by mortar deployed pilot parachutes following drogue release 
or possibly (in a low altitude abort) directly to mains (skip drogues)
First Order Drivers to CPAS design
 Drogue deploy: dynamic pressure and Mach number
 Touchdown: landed vehicle weight, landing rate of descent, minimum deploy 
altitude (from a Pad Abort)
 Additional critical design drivers:
 Fault tolerance, system mass (both total and mortar ejected masses), volume/shape for each 
parachute, environments (temperature, vibration), maximum load into structure
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Orion CPAS Concept of Operations
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Nominal Mission and High Altitude Abort Deployment Sequence
Low Altitude and Pad Abort 
Sequence (direct to mains)
Orion CPAS: Design Status
 The Engineering Development Unit (EDU) design is based upon Apollo heritage, 
CPAS Gen-1 design, and the development test program begun in 2007
 20 drop tests performed to date, evaluating performance of single and clusters of 
parachutes for various environment and design iterations  
 Numerous ground tests including vibe, off angle extraction, long term bag growth, 
materials contamination, scaled model wind tunnel, and mortar firings
 Successfully deployed Gen-1 design on Pad Abort-1 (May 2010)
 Preliminary Design Review for the EDU design (Nov 2010)
 Two test failures, both due to test technique failure (not CPAS hardware)
 Currently, NASA and LM are jointly maturing the landing system design for 
integration into Entry Flight Test-1 (EFT-1) and subsequent crewed missions
 Chutes are Government Furnished Equipment, Lockheed provides mortars
 CPAS has completed 4 of 18 EDU drop tests planned to demonstrate repeatable system 
performance, anchor performance modeling, and buy down risk prior to EFT-1 and CDR
 CPAS Critical Design Review (CDR) currently scheduled for 2015
 Formal qualification testing aligned with spaceflight Orion 2
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2/12 first Engineering 
Development Unit (EDU) 
Parachute Test Vehicle (PTV) 
airdrop test 
(C-17 extraction and landing)
4/11 Off Angle Main 
Extraction Test
7/10 Gen-1 Test
Main Line Length Ratio
12/11 Two Main EDU Test 
(pilots deploying mains)
7/11 Pneumatic Mortar
Test of EDU Drogue
JSC Unique Skills in Aerodynamic Decelerators
 Decelerator Systems Simulation (DSS)
 A multi-body 6-dof simulation based on the analysis code that was used to 
design the SRB recovery system.
Modified extensively during X-38, Pad Abort Demonstrator, and Orion programs.
 Uses: design flight tests (predicting not only the parachute loads but the 
dynamics of the coupled system), flight test data reduction, Monte Carlo analysis 
to aid in designing the parachutes and spacecraft attach structure, trade studies 
for design options, response to atmospheric perturbations such as gusts (and 
more).
 Core team with decades experience simulating, designing, integrating, and 
testing large parachute systems.
 Analysis and design experience with both ballistic and steerable ram air 
parachutes (including modeling databases and guidance algorithms).
 Testing encompassing: design of the test, design and manufacture of the test 
articles, instrumentation, integration and procedures, execution of the test, data 
reduction and analysis.
 Systems integration: from negotiating interface control documents, to defining 
achievable requirements, to working with the spacecraft designers to solve 
integrated spacecraft level problems. 
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Things to Look For
 Complexity of design and fault tolerance (including the 
retention and deployment concepts)
 Never has it been truer than with ADS that simple is better.
 Technical risk (readiness level of technology)
 Tightly coupled to experience, it’s not that low TRL is unachievable, 
just not achievable quickly and/or for little money/schedule.
 Contractor experience (parachute vendor specifically)
 Related to technical risk, is the design/architecture within the 
contractors experience or is it driving the development of new 
hardware and/or analysis capability?
 Maturity of vehicle design (wrt/requirements changes)
 What about the vehicle design has the potential to both invalidate 
the ADS design and is likely to change?
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Observations on Human Rating 
 Verification and Validation by testing alone is prohibitively expensive
 Traceability of requirements to parent specifications is critical to system certification
 Every design is different, there is no document that dictates what tests or how 
many to run
 Early risk assessment can guide not only where to focus the development of models 
and testing, but also architectural decisions at and above the parachute system
 Careful development of the models, understanding their limitations & 
assumptions, and how they are dispersed, is mandatory to demonstrate 
confidence in results
 Models must be anchored to test data
 Testing cannot be entirely replaced by analysis
 Some aspects of the system performance and interaction with the spacecraft can only 
be learned through testing
 Latent failure modes, coupled dependencies that are not obvious or identified with the models
 Throughout the CPAS project, we have strived to explore those risks where we could 
not demonstrate a solid physics model for simulations 
 Ultimately human rating relies on human judgment, to optimize the design within 
the resources available (mass, funding, & schedule)
21st AIAA Aerodynamic 
Decelerator Systems Conference 10
Conclusion
 Parachutes systems generally fail for 1of 3 reasons: 
 Failed to deploy properly
 Deployed outside the intended envelope, or 
 A fundamental error in predicting the physics
 Parachute modeling is almost exclusively empirical
 Parachutes are bounded random events, the skill is in determining where to draw 
the bounds
 Some predictions, like loads, torque, and terminal rate of descent, are physics based 
models anchored to test reconstructions
 Other aspects, like packaging, deployment, and inflation, are not modeled with enough 
confidence to verify with analysis alone
 The CPAS is an extremely lightweight, delicate collection of pieces that 
absolutely must act together simultaneously or fail with disastrous results
 Alone among the robust pieces of equipment on the spacecraft, the parachute 
system must assemble itself in midair at a wide variety of possible velocities and 
orientations 
 Successful designs are simple and ‘given the opportunity to fail’ with repeated 
demands during development testing
 At the system level; test early, test often!
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Back-up
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CPAS Deploy and Flight Test Capability Envelopes
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Flight Test Articles and Target Carrier Aircraft
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SDTV:  Low velocity deployment of ~500 lb test article to 
test a single Pilot parachute.
UH-1
MDTV:  Med velocity deployment of single Drogue 
and/or single Main with ~7-10 Klb suspended weight.
Weight Tub/Platform:  Med velocity deployment up to 
the full Orion vehicle weight.  Test parachute 
configuration may include a Cluster of Mains, 
Drogues, and/or Pilots.
CH-47 or C-130
C-130
Parachute Compartment on a MDTV:  Designed to provide 
full system and/or main cluster tests from a C-130 without 
pallet effects. Provides a stable single point attach.
or
Parachute Compartment on weight tub/platform:  Designed to 
provide full system and/or main cluster tests from a C-130.  
Includes pallet effects. Does not provide a stable single point 
attach.
Medium Drop Test Vehicle (MDTV) capability
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mid-air separation 
MDTV from CMS
Drogue 
deploy
Main static 
line deployed 
by drogue
2nd stage main 
(15’ stabilization 
parachutes 2 ea)
MDTV on Carriage Monorail System (CMS) being placed on K-loader
CMS Recovered using 
GFE G-11 cluster
LVAD pallet deployment
LVAD pallet deployment
Independently mortar deployed 
pilots, individually deploy each 
of the three mains
Full open cluster of three mains 
(confluence w/three point attach)
Three mains inflated 
in first stage
Extraction parachute static 
line deploys drogue cluster
Low Velocity Air Drop Test of the Gen-1 CPAS design
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Higher Altitude Flight Test Articles
17
PTV2:  Representative parachute compartment for CPAS 
system deployment sequence, representative wake at low 
dynamic pressure, representative capsule mass, low 
drogue dynamic pressure, reduced capsule height, center 
of gravity and moments of inertia.
LDTV:  Representative Parachute Compartment 
deployment sequence at high altitude and Mach number.
The option to add an inflatable feature to perform high 
altitude, high mach testing in the presence of a wake.
C-17
B-52 
